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The Funeral Director's Liability
For Mental Anguish
By JAcK LFrrr*
FAULTY BURIAL arrangements once provided joy to two Irish murderers who, instead of being hanged as the court had ordered, were
set free because his honor's death sentence failed to specify that their

bodies should be buried within the jail precincts. 1 Far more common
to necrological annals, however, are the shock, dismay, and emotional
upsets that accompany bungling or sharp practices in the commercial
rites by which a corpse briefly poses as a status symbol. Since death

is so expensive a venture-not only do many wraiths abandon all hope
in their new environment, but their survivors pay an average of $942
per funeral2-the legal implications of an improperly carried out funeral
*

B.A., 1951, Brooklyn College; LL.B., 1957, M.A., 1958, University of Illinois;

LL.M., 1963, University of California (Berkeley). Member of the faculty, San Francisco
Law School; member, Illinois and California Bars.
1 Queen v. Hartnett, Jebb C.C. 302 (1840).
2 Mr~oBD,THE AMwRcAN WAY OF DF&_H 39 (1963), hereafter cited as MrrFoRD
and highly recommended. Miss Mitford states that Americans in 1960 spent approximately $1.6 billion on funerals, excluding burial expenditures by private or public organizations for indigents or by the armed forces for military personnel. Some years earlier,
George Bernard Shaw had The Devil observe, "I saw a man die: he was a London
bricklayer's laborer with seven children. He left seventeen pounds club money; and his
wife spent it all on his funeral and went into the workhouse with the children the next
day. She would not have spent sevenpence on her children's schooling: the law had
to force her to let them be taught gratuitously; but on death she spent all she had. Their
imagination glows, their energies rise at the idea of death, these people; they love it,
and the more horrible it is the more they enjoy it." SHAw, Man and Superman, in SEVEN
PLAYs 620 (1951). Cf. Terrill's Adm'r v. Davis, 303 Ky. 758, 199 S.W.2d 130 (1947),
which approved a $1,600 funeral claim against a net estate of $16,000 even though
the decedent had left written instructions that, "My body is to be cremated and ashes
thrown to the wind." Dealing with arguments that the charges were excessive because
only $496 went towards burial, i.e., casket, vault, and embalming, the court said it was
customary for undertakers to charge to each funeral, under the item "services," a
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agreement deserve our attention. What is it that the aggrieved family
actually buys in these transactions? Underground novelties? 3 A casket
lining made of pure silk because "we find rayon is a lot more irritating
to the skin?" 4 A corpse pumped so efficiently with Cosmetic Tru-Lanol
Arterial Fluid that the embalmer says, "I wish I could have kept her
for four more days"?5 Or is it, perhaps, what the funeral directors have
insisted on:
The PROTECTIVE PLAN does not offer cut-rate bargainbasement funerals; only complete peace of mind, built on over
three-quarters of a century of understanding service!6

Four generations of Bay Area families have turned to this
pioneer Mortuary in their time of need. Here they find friendliness combined with capability-so important to a fitting Memorial.

7

In his care of each subject, the embalmer has a heavy responsibility, for his skill and interest will largely determine the degree of permanent mental trauma to be suffered by all those
closely associated with the deceased.8
Whether or not morticians can provide medical authority to show
that their grief therapy brings mental and emotional solace to bereaved families or that the Beautiful Memory Picture of lifeless remains
doused by soft lights has psychological value in the therapy of mournpercentage of the general overhead, such as salaries, wages, rents, automobiles, light,
water, fuel, and office supplies. See also Regina v. Vann, 2 Den. 322, 169 Eng. Rep.
523 (1851), which reversed a pauper's conviction for maintaining a common nuisance
that came about because, rather than obligate himself for high burial costs, he left his
child's body in a neighborhood yard. According to the Chief Justice, a man need not
incur a debt for burial and thereby take away the means of maintaining his family.
3 "I happened to pick up the business card of a local undertaker, which said
'Bember Brothers, Morticians and Embalmers.' In the lower right-hand comer, in smaller
type, they had printed 'Underground Novelties'l I carried that damned little card
around with me for many years, for I never got over puzzling about those Underground
Novelties. What could they have possibly furnished you? Ice water? Intergrave telephone service? Or what?" KNG, Mnmm EN MY Gnows OLDEa 96 (Signet ed. 1960).
4 Mitford, Americans Don't Want Fancy Funerals, Saturday Evening Post, November
23, 1963, p. 8.
5 MrrrorD 223.
6 From an advertisement in the San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 25, 1964, p. 16, cos.
5-6, which adds that, on request, details about this promised peace of mind will be
mailed promptly in a plain wrapper. (All emphasis is in the original.)
7 From an advertisement in the Oakland Tribune, Jan. 26, 1964, p. 29, cols. 1-2,
which adds that the "prestige" of this service costs no more.
8 Quoted from an unidentified embalming textbook in MrrsonD 90.
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ing, these graveside entrepreneurs act less for redemption of the dead
than comfort of the living. 9 Primitive burial customs, like that of
burying the dead inside their own homes, may have been reverently
designed to insure reincarnation of the deceased in favorable surroundings, 10 but our current religious precepts demand few, if any, of the
secular trappings so rampant today. Salvation, alas, requires more than
the hiring of a licensed undertaker.loa
We should recognize that the corpse in a modem American funeral
serves primarily as a viaduct conducting sympathy, good will, and
prestige towards the leading mourners. These emotional outpourings
are the real objects of the agreement between the survivors and the
funeral director, even though their discussion.may refer only to items
like "one $647 casket," "30 minutes of organ music," or "use of the
main slumber room for three days." Consolation being the aim, what
else would result from a breach of the agreement but mental anguish?
Is it proper, for example, to hold that parents' only legal damage from
a cremation society's loss of their dead child's ashes is $12, the cost
of the urn and its storage?'1 Or that parents cannot maintain an action
against an undertaking firm for refusing, after a collision between the
hearse and a railroad train, to gather up the young decedent's scattered remains and preserve them for humane burial?12 Or that a widow
could recover only the contract price she paid to an undertaker who
so negligently prepared her husband's body for shipment that when
it arrived it was decomposed, giving off such an offensive odor that
the casket had to be left in the open air during the funeral ceremonies?" a
9MrrFonD, 90-95 & passim.
30 1 FRAzER, THE GOLDEN BouGa 101-05 (3d ed. 1911; 1955 reprint). "Primitives,"
of course, vary as much in their attitude towards the dead as do "moderns." In Africa,
for example, a native chief agreed to have his mother's dead body poisoned and left
near a man-eating lion's trail. When the beast was found dead the next day, lying
poisoned across the woman's body, a British ranger assured the chief, "The government
will now see that the remains of your mother will receive the best possible interment.
No expense will be spared." The chief answered, "Well, I hate to see the old lady
wasted like that. We've been having a lot of trouble with hyenas lately. Let's leave
her out another few nights and see if she can't get some hyenas." HurN, Hu mm 158
(Bantam ed. 1955).
ioa See N.Y. Times, Sept. 3, 1963, p. 35, col. 8 for a lengthy article in which clergymen of the three major faiths demanded a curb on the neo-pagan corpse worship of the
modem funeral. But cf. the reply of the president of the National Funeral Directors
Association who said clergymen have highly praised undertakers and that "The people
of our country are satisfied with their funeral director and his practices." N.Y. Times,
Sept. 13, 1963, p. 31, Col. 8. See also N.Y. Times, Oct. 17, 1963, p. 71, col. 2 for a
Methodist cleric's defense of the modem funeral.
"1See Kneass v. Cremation Society, 103 Wash. 521, 175 Pac. 172 (1918).
12 See Nail v. McCullough & Lee, 88 Okla. 243, 212 Pac. 981 (1923).
13 See Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913).
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Yet many courts refuse to consider mental suffering, unaccompanied
by physical injury, as a valid claim against a funeral director who negligently breached his contract. In this article, I hope to demonstrate
that those courts have misconceived the difference between "contract"
as the formalization of legal relationships and a particular contract
made up of specific obligations, and that once this difference is acknowledged a funeral director's negligence will subject him to liability for
all the harm occurring within the contracting parties' original contemplation, including (and especially) "pure" mental suffering.
Establishing this proposition will take us from a discussion of legislative controls over the funeral industry, through intentional violations of funerary obligations, to negligent breaches of funeral contracts.
Throughout this analysis, the only conduct to be reviewed is that which
provoked lawsuits and which, presumably, characterizes a minority of
funeral directors. As a group, undertakers object to characterizations
which portray them as "ruthless, cunning, greedy, cutthroat, fraudulent, vulturous, deceitful, overbearing hucksters of grief' whose goal
is to "capitalize on the sadness, sorrow, vulnerability and bereavement
of a decedents family" through activities that include "criminal conduct, punishable by fine, jail and license revocation." 14
In fairness to the trade, we should remember that we too often
suspect those who profit from our misfortunes, be they attorneys, physicians, or funeral directors, as in some way the original cause of the
misfortune. We have the right, under present commercial transactions,
to expect a funeral director to assuage grief, but we dare not blame
him for failing to prolong life.
Legislative Regulation
Because the funeral industry is so intimately connected with the
public welfare through society's concern for the dead, the business
operations of funeral directors and embalmers are subject to legislative
control under the state police power. 15 The extent of this control varies
14 The Los Angeles Funeral Directors Association, disturbed by a fictional telecast,
recently petitioned the Federal Communications Commission for equal time to answer
such implications. See The San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 7, 1964, p. 37, cols. 7-8.
't See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CoPE §§ 7600-11; 16 CAL. ADm. CODnE § 1221;
Memorial Gardens Ass'n, Inc. v. Smith, 16 IMI.2d 116, 156 N.E.2d 587 (1959), which
requires "pre-need" burial payments to be treated as trust funds and is similar in purpose to 33 Ors. CAL. ATr'Y GEN. 167 (1959).
As used in this article, "funeral director," "undertaker," and "mortician" are interchangeable words, referring to a person, partnership, association, corporation, or other
organization engaged in preparing, directing, and supervising the burial or disposal
of dead human bodies, and maintaining a funeral establishment for these purposes. See
CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7615. "Embalmer" refers to one qualified to disinfect or
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among the many jurisdictions but is based on concern with public
health and possible concealment of crime, 16 and on a legislative insight
that when emotions are strong the undue commercialization of death
should be avoided. 17 Regardless of whether mortuary activities are
considered a business or a profession, or both, the state may require
minimum qualifications from its practitioners (such as graduation from
a prescribed school' and passing of a written examination' 9 ) and may
determine the physical components of the funeral establishment (such
as having the business office, display room, preparation room, and
chapel at the same location) .20
Legislatures recognize the special dignity, decency, and honor
associated with the ceremonies of death and may demand appropriate
qualities in the men who perform these rites. Against a funeral director's objections that "unprofessional conduct" had not been defined
and thus could not sufficiently warn him of what activities to avoidin his case consisting of failure to pay another funeral director money
received for that purpose; of increasing a funeral bill, after a price
agreement had been reached, because he discovered the decedent's
life insurance was greater than he had known; and of receiving nearly
all of a 72 year old woman's life savings for a prearranged funeral, on
the false inducement that he could help her get an old age pensionin answer, a court has declared:
preserve dead human bodies by the injection or external application of antiseptics, disinfectants or preservative fluids; to prepare bodies for transportation after their deaths
by contagious or infectious diseases; and to use derma surgery or plastic art for restoring mutilated features. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7640.
In the fiscal year 1962-63, California recognized the licenses of 797 funeral directors
(which in this instance refers to the funeral establishment, rather than the individual
practitioner), 2,870 embalmers, and 567 apprentice embalmers. During that period,
this group was subjected to 89 official complaints and investigations, and 40 hearings.
See BD.

OF

FusrAL Dnocuons

& EmBALzmas,

AN ruL RzronT

(fiscal

year

1962-1963).
16 See State v. Rice, 115 Md. 317, 80 Atl. 1026 (1911); People v. Ringe, 197 N.Y.
143, 90 N.E. 451 (1910).
17 See Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 87
P.2d 848 (1939); Prata Undertaking Co. v. State Bd. of Embalming & Funeral Directing, 55 R.I. 454, 182 At. 808, 104 A.L.R. 389 (1936); Mashburn v. State Bd. of Funeral
Directors & Embalmers, 132 Cal. App. 2d 126, 281 P.2d 577 (1955).
28 See Walton v. Commonwealth, 187 Va. 275, 46 S.E.2d 373 (1948) (dicta),
which actually held that an undertaker not licensed in Virginia, though licensed in Tennessee, did not unlawfully practice the trade in Virginia by conducting one funeral
there. In California, only two schools of mortuary science are approved, one in San
Francisco, one in Los Angeles. See CAL. STATE BD. OF FuNxRAL DmEcroas & EM-

LErran (undated).
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 7622; 14 OPs. CAL. A-r'Y GEN. 111 (1949).
21 Ops. CAL. A7-r' GEN. 18 (1953).

BALMEEs, INFOEm.ATON
19 CAL.
20
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To define, by a set of rules and regulations, the manner in which these
delicate requirements shall be met, would appear quite difficult of
accomplishment, though it might be done. But these requirements
are easily recognized when met, and their absence is glaring to the
trained
eye and mind and shocking to all the finer sensibilities of
21
men.

To prevent funeral directors from taking unfair advantage of their
patrons at a time when the prospective buyers are in no condition to
withstand pressure, the state may prohibit solicitation of business while
death is impending or has recently occurred. 22 Despite claims that a
state board has no legal authority to control an undertakers securing
of business and that the board may inquire only into the proper care
and disposition of dead human bodies, the entire operation of the business is what the legislature intends to regulate. No conduct is more
objectionable than the use, at a charity hospital, of "cappers" or "steerers" who watch the list of dangerously ill patients and, on death, immediately contact the decedents family to solicit the business of burying
the corpse. These actions "bring to mind the vulture hovering over
the dying animal preparatory to swooping down upon it as soon as
23
the breath leaves its body."
2lPierstoff v. Board of Embalmers & Funeral Directors, 68 Ohio App. 453, 456,
41 N.E.2d 889, 891 (1941). In Beatty v. State Bd. of Undertakers, 352 Pa. 565, 43
A.2d 127 (1945), the court said that a definition of "misconduct" is within the board's
discretion and may consist of the breach of any generally accepted canon of ethics and
propriety governing the respectful and reverential burial of the dead. See also Cooley v.
State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 141 Cal. App. 2d 293, 296 P.2d 588
(1956); People v. Ackley, 270 App. Div. 958, 62 N.Y.S.2d 771 (1946), a criminal conviction affimed in 296 N.Y. 731, 70 N.E.2d 544 (1946); Daggett v. State Bd. of Funeral
Directors & Embalmers, 44 Cal. App. 2d 742, 112 P.2d 956 (1941). The suspended
funeral director in Cooley, supra, unsuccessfully blamed a rush of business for such conditions in his preparation room as maggots coming from a decomposing infant's body,
scattered
filth throughout the room, and one dead body stacked on top of another body.
22
Drummey v. State Bd. of Funeral Directors & Embalmers, 13 Cal. 2d 75, 87
P.2d 848 (1939).
23
Louisiana Undertaking Co. v. Louisiana State Bd. of Embalmers, 58 So. 2d 303,
305 (La. Ct. App. 1952). Funeral directors seem to be at odds over whether a more
common type of solicitation, that of advertising by stating prices, is proper for the trade.
See Grissom v. Van Ordsell, 137 So. 2d 246 (Fla. Ct. App. 1962), which held that
undertaking is a business rather than a profession and that, in consequence, restrictions
on advertising went beyond the board's power to protect the public peace, health, safety,
welfare, and morals. Miss Mitford said of the contending forces in that litigationwhich included newspapers offering editorial support for the right to advertise--"Seldom
have appeals to principle so transparently cloaked self-interest." MrrFonn 239. But cf.
Queensbury v. Estep, 142 W. Va. 426, 95 S.E.2d 832 (1956), which declared that
board rules prohibiting price advertising were valid. Since newer businesses are more
likely to need such advertising, we should note that, except for the state health director,
the members of the West Virginia board which promulgated this rule were all licensed
funeral directors and embalmers having at least five consecutive years of experience
in that state.
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As the key process in modem funerary practices, embalming has
sometimes inspired more legislative and administrative action than

courts have upheld as valid controls in the public interest. Undertakers
regularly insist that embalming is an essential hygienic measure, bene-

ficial to the public and a necessary qualification for hopeful practitioners of the trade. But even in 1909 the Massachusetts judicial Court

could strike down a board of health rule which made an embalming
license a prerequisite to an undertaking license, because the rule was

unwarranted, improper, and illegal. Mentioning that "no argument"
had been made to show that general embalming was necessary to

preserve the public health and that the court knew of no such necessity,
the court said:
Except in those cases where embalming is desired for a special reason,
we know of nothing connected with the duties of an undertakerthat
calls for the work of a licensed embalmer.... The only particular in
which the respondents have suggested ... that performance of an
undertaker's duties by a licensed embalmer would tend to promote
the public health, is that an embalmer would be more likely to discover that a deceased person died of a contagious disease than an
undertaker who is not an embalmer.... No evidence is furnished

that, through his knowledge of the business of embalming, one can
form an opinion which an ordinary undertaker of experience could
not form of the cause of death of a person whose body is seen by him.
But if there may be some slight increase of knowledge, from this
source, to one preparing a human body for burial, its relation to the
public health, if any, is too remote to be made a foundation for legislation or regulation. 24
The stress on statutory imperatives about embalming was perhaps
a simple business tactic with which established morticians harassed
prospective competitors, 25 but the commercial popularity of the preservative art has a somewhat different financial warrant. What it does
24

Wyeth v. Thomas, 200 Mass. 474, 479-80, 86 N.E. 925, 927-28 (1909) (emphasis added). Accord, State v. Rice, 115 Md. 317, 80 Atl. 1026 (1911); People v. Binge,
197 N.Y. 143, 90 N.E. 451 (1910). But cf. State Bd. v. Cooksey, 147 Fla. 337, 3 So.
2d 502 (1941), which states at 3 So. 2d 506: "When we consider the service which a
funeral director is required to render to the public and the duty which he owes to the
public to see that that service is properly, efficiently, honestly and promptly rendered,
we can find nothing unreasonable or unwarranted in the statutory requirement that
each funeral director shall be a licensed embalmer." See also MrrFoun 81-90 for further
evidence that embalming has little, if any, public health functions.
25 See People v. Ringe, 197 N.Y. 143, 151, 90 N.E. 451, 454 (1910), which observed,
"We cannot refrain from the thought that the act in question was conceived and promulgated in the interests of those then engaged in the undertaking business, and that the
relation which the business bears to the general health, morals, and welfare of the state
had much less influence upon its originators than the prospective monopoly that could
be exercised with the aid of its provisions."
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is make possible drawn-out mortuary proceedings at maximized cost. 20

By emphasizing an expensive process that has no hygienic values, the
funeral industry, willingly or not, has placed itself in a position of admitting to near-fraud in its marketing practices or of justifying its
sales activities as capable of serving its customers' emotional needs.
Once emotional health is acknowledged as the "special reason" for
modem funeral arrangements, a breach of that agreement should create
liability commensurate with the parties' original purpose.
Liability for Intentional Acts
Courts are often ready to award an individual compensation from
a party who has deliberately injured him, commonly ruling that acts
which are legally unassailable if performed under certain conditions
become charged with liability when intentionally done. At the turn
of the century, Bigelow illustrated this principle by stating:
A workman on a house might negligently let a stick fall at my feet,
as I was passing along the street, and if, though startled, I was not
hit, the workman probably would not be liable for the act; but if he
be liable, for
threw the stick at me, with the same result, he would
passion would instinctively be aroused to redress. 27
As applied to actions seeking damages for mental distress, however, the principle became clouded because the action itself was
viewed suspiciously. Courts sometimes felt there are "many moral obligations too delicate and subtle to be enforced in the rude way of giving
money compensation for their violation." 28 Lacking more refined methods of granting legal relief, those courts denied recovery even to plaintiffs who might have welcomed the coarse palliative of money damages.
Such fine distinctions peppered the law that the Indiana Supreme
28 MroaD passim.
2
7 BiGELow, ToRTs 28 (7th ed. 1901)

(citations omitted). Bigelow notes another
reason for this distinction, namely that an intended wrong is more likely to do harm
than one not intended. See also Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d
295, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963), which states as dicta that increased liability
for intentional acts reflects the psychological fact that solicitude for the actor's interests
weighs less in the balance as his moral guilt increases and the social utility of his conduct
diminishes.
Cf.
28 Chapman v. Western Union Tel. Co., 88 Ga. 763, 15 S.E. 901, 904 (1892)
Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913), which states that if people
generally believe in recovery for certain kinds of mental suffering they should secure
an appropriate law by initiative or legislative enactment. "Such a law could define what
cases should be considered within the doctrine, and definitely fix the amount recoverable. The jury and courts would thus be relieved of the unpleasant duty of trying to
measure in dollars and cents the degree or extent of mental suffering in such cases."
Id. at 238, 134 Pac. at 155. For an enactment along parallel lines, see TBE CoDE OF
HA nMunAni (ca. 2600 B.C.). See also text at notes 74-83.
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Court could explain "not one cent" would be recovered for a plaintiff's
mental agonies while a train bore down on him as his foot lay caught
in the track, but he could obtain damages for the mental anguish resulting from his having to go through life a cripple. 29
Battered by these precedents, the cause of action for emotional
distress due to improper handling of the dead contains futile distinctions galore but may be roughly categorized as follows: many jurisdictions bar recovery if the dereliction amounts to no more than a
negligent breach of contract, though others permit this litigation; 30
many jurisdictions (often the same ones which reject a negligence
basis) allow compensation if the wrongful act was wilful or wanton
or amounted to gross negligence;31 and in all jurisdictions the damages
are apparently available following commission of a tort which can
support an action for some damages and includes mental suffering as
82
a natural and probable result.

The plaintiff's first hurdle is in establishing himself as possessed
of some right that could have been violated. Under early English law,
an heir had a property interest in his ancestors' escutcheons and graveside monuments, and the decedents executor or some other person in
charge of the funeral had property in the shroud, though the cadaver
itself was regarded as caro data vermibus-flesh given to worms-and
treated as being no person's property.33 American courts, however,
recognized that those entitled to possess the body for burial had rights
visualized as being property in its broadest and most general sense,
i.e., something over which the law gives exclusive control, 34 and that

the right of exemption from wrongful acts affecting this interest is
itself the property. 5 Since the next of kin have the right and the duty
to give the remains a Christian burial, a duty "which loving hands
perform as a privilege," interference with the mourners is actionable31
29

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Ferguson, 157 Ind. 64, 60 N.E. 674 (1901) (dicta).
3D See text at notes 67-104.
31 See Sanford v. Ware, 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10 (1950); Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo.
App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913).
32 Ibid.
3 See 3 Coxu, INsTrrrrs *203 (1628); 2 BLACKSTONE,

CoMMENTAwES

*429

(1766). Stealing a shroud was felony, but stealing a corpse was not (though it was a
high misdemeanor). See 3 C nTrr, Can-wAL LAw *948 (1832).
34 Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238 (1891).
35 Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905).
38 Louisville & N. R.R. v. Hull, 113 Ky. 561, 571, 68 S.W. 433, 435 (1902); Wright
v. Hollywood Cemetery Co., 112 Ga. 884, 38 S.E. 94 (1901) (where the interference
was unlawful and unwarranted). But cf. Gatzow v. Buening, 106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W.
1003 (1900), which denied recovery to a father who suffered no injury of any kind
save to his feelings, stating that the fathers grief was not an exception to the rule that
mental distress alone is too remote and difficult of measurement to justify an award of
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The survivors' rights can be summed up as encompassing a right to

custody of the dead body; to having the body in its condition at death,
without mutilation; to having it treated with decent respect, without
87
outrage or indignity; and to be able to bury it without interference.

Criticism has been directed against the need to discover (and in

effect create) an independent tort, such as trespass quare clausum
fregit to a plot in a graveyard, to sustain an action for injury to feelings, like a father's grief because his son's body was wrongfully dis-

interred and reburied in a charity lot in a grave containing two other
bodies. According to an Illinois court, "The mind instinctively revolts
at the mere suggestion that any well ordered system of jurisprudence
should find it necessary to resort to so flimsy a subterfuge in order to
sustain a recovery of substantial damages for such a tort, when wilfully or wantonly committed."38 Even so, the existence of a primary

tort has been useful to plaintiffs complaining about mutilation, improper detention, or similar acts.
Courts treat unauthorized autopsies or post-mortem examinations,
though done in the name of science, as wilful mutilation of a corpse,
subjecting those who performed the operation to liability for a survivor's emotional distress. 39 A funeral director need not fear liability
damages. What happened in Gatzow, supra, was this: the defendants, members of a
liveryman's association, objected to the activities of the undertaker conducting the child's
funeral, for he paid lower wages than the association tolerated. Accordingly, as the
funeral services for the plaintiffs child ended and the pallbearers were about to place
the coffin in the hearse, the drivers of the hearse and carriage, on instructions, sped
off in their vehicles and left the father to make what new arrangments he could.
87 See Infield v. Cope, 58 N.M. 308, 270 P.2d 716 (1954). See also Sanford v.
Ware, 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10 (1950); Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Sup.
Ct. 1950); Sworski v. Simmons, 208 Minn. 201, 293 N.W. 309 (1940); Finley v. Atlantic
Transport Co., 220 N.Y. 249, 115 N.E. 715 (1917).
Ordinarily the surviving spouse or next of kin in order of testamentary succession
is the proper person to assert these rights. See, e.g., Edwards v. Franke, 364 P.2d 60
(Alaska Sup. Ct. 1961), which denied recovery for mental anguish because the complaining party was the decedents common law, rather than licensed, husband; Teasley
v. Thompson, 204 Ark. 959, 165 S.W.2d 940 (1942), which allowed a married woman's
mother to bring the action since the surviving husband had not manifested the slightest
interest in the decedents welfare; Floyd v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry., 167 N.C. 55, 83
S.E. 12 (1914), which held that a mother lacked standing to sue for the negligent mutilation of her son's body, since it was the fathers right to recover. Floyd, supra, was
decided in spite of a dissent which said: "Great nature tells us that her suffering [for
the indignity to the body of her son] is something apart from and usually greater than
that of her husband." Id. at 63, 83 S.E. at 15.
3
8 Mensinger v. O'Hara, 189 Ill. App. 48, 52 (1914), commenting on Meagher v.
Driscoll, 99 Mass. 281 (1868). Accord, Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238
(1891).
39 See Alderman v. Ford, 146 Kan. 698, 72 P.2d 981 (1937); Koerber v. Patek,
123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905); Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 50 N.W. 238
(1891); Phillips v. Newport, 28 Tenn. App. 187, 187 S.W.2d 965 (1945); Palenzke v.
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if, on reasonable grounds that the autopsy was proper, he simply furnished a room for its performance. He does not become liable in tort
just because the unintended effect of his lawful act helps someone else
accomplish a wrong.40 But he must answer in damages if, on the pretense that his operations were necessary for embalming purposes, he
cuts open a child's body, removes its liver and stomach, and covers
the body with a sheet to prevent the mother from seeing its post-operative condition. It is a deliberate violation of a mother's rights to increase
her already great grief at the child's accidental death by burdening
her with the fact that the child's body was completely opened and its
4
vital organs cut loose, removed, and then replaced. 1
Mutilation also occurs, so as to justify an award for mental anguish
accompanying indignity, insult, and humiliation, when undertakers
receive the body of a woman who had "a beautiful head of hair, very
thick and of great length," and, by cutting off the hair, render the
body unfit for viewing by her husband, relatives, and friends. The
cutting required a physical effort, intentionally performed, which could
have been accomplished only by design: a large and heavy head of
hair cannot be removed by mere neglect. Evil intent is not necessary;
wilful misconduct is enough. 42 Nonetheless, a husband who wished to
remember many years of happy association in marriage has no cause
of action for mental suffering from the disturbance of his wife's body
if the malice he alleges can be treated as a pleader's whim. The husband's complaint charged that he gave full and specific instructions
to a funeral home to have a diamond ring, wedding band, and wrist
watch buried with his wife's body, but that a vice-president of the
firm, acting after the relatives and friends had left the grave, raised
the casket lid and
reached in the said casket with his hands and took hold of the left
hand and arm of said decedent, and after having raised said left hand
Brnning, 98 IMI.App. 644 (1900); Foley v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 551, 37 N.Y.S. 471
(1896).
40
Konency v. Hohenschuh, 188 Iowa 1075, 173 N.W. 901 (1919). See also Sturgeon
v. Crosby Mortuary, Inc., 140 Neb. 82, 299 N.W. 378 (1941).
41 Phillips v. Newport, 28 Tenn. App. 187, 187 S.W.2d 965 (1945). See also Foley
v. Phelps, 1 App. Div. 551, 555, 37 N.Y.S. 471, 474 (1896), which says that a surviving
widow has "the right to what remains when the breath leaves the body, and not merely
to such a hacked, hewed and mutilated corpse as some stranger, an offender against
the criminal law, may choose to turn over to an afflicted relative."
42 Mensinger v. O'Hara, 189 Ill.
App. 48 (1914). Cf. Perati v. Atkinson, 213 Cal.
App. 2d 472, 28 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1963), an entirely different factual context, which said
that intentional infliction of emotional harm without physical trauma can be a ground
of liability, but only when the defendant's conduct is outrageous or has gone beyond
all reasonable bounds of decency. Where physical harm has not resulted from the emotional distress, explained the decision, courts tend to look for more in the way of extreme
outrage as an assurance that the claimed mental distress is not fictitious.

May, 1964]

FUNERAL DIRECTORS

and arm by vigorous jerks which caused the entire corpse of said decedent to quiver and shake, forcibly and wrongfully removed said
wrist watch from the left hand
diamond ring and wedding band and
43
and arm of said decedents body.
Affirming a judgment on the pleadings in favor of the funeral home,
an Ohio court said:
It is obvious that removing the rings and watch did not disturb the
corpse any more than did putting them on. Slight indeed must have
been the quiver and shake of the body in doing either. This is far
from the type of cases cited by plaintiff where the dead bodies were
mutilated or otherwise desecrated. It is not claimed the body was
even scratched or its position in the casket changed. The most that
can be said of the acts of the defendant, from plaintiff's standpoint,
is that they violated the instructions given defendant and thereby
breached its contract with respect to burying the body with the jewehy on it."
This reasoning, I think, cannot be coped with on an analytic level.
Unless the court's own words convince a reader of their folly, no outsider's arguments will prod him towards that goal. We should understand, however, that the court was functioning in a jurisdiction which
forbade recovery for mental suffering unaccompanied by bodily injury
unless the defendant's acts were done maliciously. Placing an aggrieved
party in such a position, where he must find some way of showing a
legal concept, i.e., malice, as a fact rather than a conclusion of law, or
must suffer some physical harm to preserve his rights to emotional
equilibrium, not only clashes with the general principle of minimizing
damages but encourages "legal maladies" like a near-simultaneous occurrence of emotional shock, fainting, and bruising from the resultant
fall to the ground. 45 We have, in myth at least, such liability-conscious
43Grill v. Abele Funeral Home,
44 Id. at 53, 42 N.E.2d at 789.

Inc., 69 Ohio App. 51, 52, 42 N.E.2d 788 (1940).
Cf. People v. Bullington, 27 Cal. App. 2d 396, 80
P.2d 1030 (1938), a criminal case which reversed an embalmer's conviction of feloniously mutilating a dead body by removing two gold crowns from the decedents teeth.
The trial court had erroneously taken the position that removal of the crowns from the
natural teeth to which they had been cemented constituted mutilation as a matter of
law. In so doing, the court improperly used the definition of "mutilate" that is applied
to books and manuscripts, rather than to the human body.
45 See, e.g., Clemm v. Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry., 126 Kan. 181, 268 Pac. 103 (1928),
where the fainting spell probably was an honest one occurring when the plaintiff learned
her husband's body had not been carried on the proper train. The court observed that
the widow's fright, terror, grief, shock, and fall with resulting physical injuries were
substantially simultaneous, and resulted naturally and directly from the railroad's negligence. "To say that the mental anguish preceded the physical injuries by a second or
two, and therefore that there is no liability for either, is to make too much of a refinement for practical purposes, and one that would tend to defeat justice rather than promote it." Id. at 183, 268 Pac. at 106. Cf. Espinosa v. Beverly Hospital, 114 Cal. App. 2d
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citizens that the victim of a rear-end collision, when approached by his
first rescuer, is likely to say, "It hurts right between the seventh cervical
and first dorsal vertebrae. Clearly a whiplash." Why should we demand
extensions of this native readiness to conform to court ritual by asking
plaintiffs for anatomical certainty of where they hurt? Given facts
which establish the likelihood of emotional distress, we should determine its existence on the basis of a plaintiff's credibility rather than

abrasions.
Proof of circumstances showing an utter disregard for the feelings
of a surviving family has been held sufficient to justify actual damages,
even though no evidence is offered to establish the mental anguish.
When the survivors prove that an undertaking firm fraudulently substituted a cheaper coffin for the one ordered, charged for a robe that
was never delivered, and buried the decedent in a coffin so small his
arms and legs extended outside the box, the defendant cannot excuse
himself by claiming that all undertakers did business that way and he
acted to keep even. 46 Fraudulent reburial of a corpse without casket,
case, or shroud, only a few inches below ground surface, after the surviving wife had contracted for proper transfer of the remains to a
new cemetery, also sustains recovery for mental anguish resulting from
the undertaker's misrepresentations and gross negligence. Said the
court:
It is a matter of common knowledge that near relatives, irrespective
of race, color, or creed, have the tenderest feelings and emotions for
the remains of their dead. From the nature of his calling and experience, the defendant was especially aware of this. He knew, or ought
to have known, that the plaintiff, the widow of the dead man, would
naturally and probably suffer mental anguish if he were neglectful
of the contract which he had made
with her, or inflicted indignities
4
upon the remains of her husband. 7
No protection is afforded an intermeddling undertaker who insists
that the embalming job he performed was beneficial and necessary,
232, 249 P.2d 843 (1953), which denied recovery for parents' mental anguish at having
been given the wrong newly-born infant to take home from the hospital. The court said
that if the wrong delivery had produced such an impact on the nervous system as to
cause physical injuries, the parents could recover for the physical injuries, plus mental
suffering, anxiety, and loss of sleep. Unfortunately for the parents, the mother's severe
back pain, stomach pain, and overall aches were not considered a sufficient enough
injury on which to attach liability.
46j. E. Dunn & Co. v. Smith, Tex. Civ. App., 74 S.W. 576 (1903). See also Boyle
v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 Atl. 273 (1927).
47 Sanford v. Ware, 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10, 14 (1950), which, though arising
out of a breach of contract, was treated as a tort action. See also Spomer v. City of Grand
Junction, 144 Colo. 250, 355 P.2d 960 (1960); Jacobus v. Congregation of Children of
Israel, 107 Ga. 518, 33 S.E. 853 (1899). But cf. Norton v. Kull, 74 Misc. 476, 132
N.Y.S. 387 (1911).
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if he had failed to secure the prior approval of the decedents known
relatives. Although embalming is generally recognized as a proper
service, the parents of a son who committed suicide are the only ones
entitled to authorize this service. To say that the parents had the body
embalmed later is no defense, for the subsequent embalming cannot
wipe out the cause of action for mental suffering arising from the
wanton and callous disregard of the parents' rights. 48 This principle
has been undercut when malice is essential to uphold the action for
mental pain. An undertaker may then be spared from liability if he
shows that he followed the coroner's instructions in removing a suddenly-stricken person from a physician's office to his own establishment,
that the surviving wife's whereabouts were generally but not specifically known, and that he released the body to another funeral home
49
on the wife's request as soon as the embalming process had ended.
Perhaps these contrasting positions should be reconciled in this way:
The survivor has a right to obtain the body in its condition at death.
Unless an undertaker has received the corpse from someone who apparently represents the family's interests, 0 he cannot excuse himself
48Sworski v. Simmons, 208 Minn. 201, 293 N.W. 309 (1940), in which three judges
dissented because of the undertakers reliance on the coroner's actual or apparent authority. See also Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1950).
49 Kimple v. Riedel, 133 So. 2d 437 (Fla. Ct. App. 1961). Cf. Hale v. Brown, 84
Ariz. 61, 323 P.2d 955 (1958), where the gist of the surviving wife's unsuccessful action
appeared to be a complaint about the time of embalming, rather than its wrongfulness.
She alleged a conspiracy between the morticians and her deceased husband's employer
to wrongfully embalm her husband's body and thus suppress evidence as to the cause
of his death. By a 3-2 vote, summary judgment in the defendants' favor was airned,
the court majority asserting that the wife never showed in what particular the wrongful
act caused her mental anguish. The dissenters insisted that wrongful embalming is a
wilful tort, actionable per se, for nominal damages at least, and that the wife was not
required to allege how the wrongful act led to her mental anguish.
5
0 Disputes do arise over which persons have authority to make funeral arrangements and which must pay the bill. See Terril's Adm'r v. Davis, 303 Ky. 758, 199 S.W.2d
130 (1947), which held that the decedents brother had such authority because "A
person is entitled to a Christian burial, and it cannot be delayed to determine upon
whom the legal obligation to proceed with the burial rests most heavily, nor should
the undertaker be compelled to await an adjustment of any dispute that might arise."
Id. at 761, 199 S.W.2d at 132. See also H. M. Patterson & Son v. Payne, 90 Ga. App.
699, 83 S.E.2d 841 (1954), which relieved a surviving husband, who had lived apart
from his deceased wife, from liability for funeral arrangements which the wife's sister
had made and to which the husband had simply given consent. See also Jones v. Caine,
222 N.Y.S.2d 563 (N.Y. Police Ct. 1961), which observed that at the time of death
the immediate family is usually so emotionally upset that they are practically useless
in making funeral arrangements. "About the only one who has his complete wits about
him is the undertaker." 222 N.Y.S.2d at 565. But usually one person, an uncle, aunt,
or friend, takes control of the arrangements and becomes the family leader. Generally
he has no intention of being liable for the funeral expenses, but he may intend to accept
liability; this intention, however, must be clearly spelled out before a funeral director
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for the effects on the survivor of his wrongful embalming by asserting
that undertakers customarily do not bother to obtain family authorization.5 1 But he should, for example, be allowed to establish that decomposition of the body had already set in, summertime weather was
hastening the decay, and his acts were designed to preserve the body
in its best possible form to serve the interests of an unknown or unreachable survivor.52 A funeral director who acts reasonably and successfully to prevent a known harm should not be penalized for his
technical trespass in performing the work, nor for a survivor's laterdisclosed preference in favor of the averted harm.
Some funeral directors have used dead bodies as collateral security
to enforce payment of their bills, bringing to mind the biblical dispute
between Michael and the Devil about the body of Moses, "though the
record does not disclose whether such contentions arose over the possession of the body for burial."53 What has arisen in various records,
however, are histories of a shocked widow having to spend an hour
or two in the mid-morning haggling and bartering with an undertaker
for the body of her husband, which the undertaker refused to release
unless she immediately paid his bill for an unauthorized embalming; 54
of a mother being unable for days to reclaim the body of her five year
old child, which a funeral establishment had wrongfully obtained after
the child was accidentally shot and killed;55 of a mother being told,
two weeks after her son's death, that his body had not been cremated,
despite her having paid an undertaker in full to do so and despite her
belief that it had already been accomplished, and that the undertaker
would continue to hold the body until the mother paid a fifteen months'
old balance on her late son-in-law's funeral bill. 0 Substantial damages
can so charge him. See also Konency v. Hohenschuc, 188 Iowa 1075, 173 N.W. 901
(1919) for an illustration of an undertakers reliance on the apparent authority of those
having custody of the corpse.
51 A defense, similar in part, was urged in Hale v. Brown, 84 Ariz. 61, 323 P.2d
955 (1958), but was not decisive.
52 Ibid.
53 See Bonaparte v. Fraternal Funeral Home, 206 N.C. 652, 656, 175 S.E. 137,
139 (1934).
54 Bonaparte v. Fraternal Funeral Home, 206 N.C. 652, 175 S.E. 137 (1934).
55 Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1950). See also Sworski v.
Simmons, 208 Minn. 201, 293 N.W. 309 (1940). And compare Southern Life & Health
Ins. Co. v. Morgan, 21 Ala. App. 5, 105 So. 161 (1925) with Jefferson County Burial
Society v. Scott, 218 Ala. 354, 118 So. 644 (1933). In Southern, a father was held entitled to damages for vexation and distress of mind (though not for mental anguish)
because a life insurance company's agent refused to surrender a death certificate necessary for the son's burial; in Jefferson County, based on the complaint in Southern, a
mother was denied recovery for the wrongful detention of her daughter's body.
56 Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925). See also Jordan Undertaking Co. v. Asberry, 230 Ala. 97, 159 So. 683 (1935).
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are proper in these cases because the rule barring recovery for mental
anguish from a negligent breach of contract does not extend to purely
tort actions where the wrongful act reasonably implies malice or where,
from entire want of attention to duty or great indifference to the persons, property, or rights of others, enough malice will be imputed as
would justify the assessment of exemplary or punitive damages.13 In
commenting on such commercial usages, the Washington Supreme
Court has said:
[13t is hard to conceive of more refined cruelty and wilful wrong than
that which the evidence shows was practiced in this case. It is doubtful if any threat could be more calculated not only to compel payment of the debt, but also to produce mental anguish and suffering,
payment would
and it was thought that by first creating the5 suffering
8
follow to put an end to the mental torture.
Law being a Janus-like creature,5 9 other courts have rejected claims
for mental suffering based on similar facts. The behavior of a funeral
director, in Mississippi at least, does not imply malice if he collects payment for funeral services from the decedents mother and then, on her
request to deliver the fully accoutered body to her home for a wake, he
refuses to do so until she pays an extra 17 dollars for a tie, gloves, and
other accessories meant to enhance the corpse's appearance. The undertaker's demands are not unreasonable or oppressive, since he could well
believe that the mother, who already paid him 200 dollars, still had
funds left from a life insurance policy worth 420 dollars. 0 Elsewhere,
an undertaker has been given a dispensation to lie about his reasons
57Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1950).
58 Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash. 134, 138, 233 Pac. 299, 300 (1925). The defendant
sought to excuse himself by explaining that nothing worse was done with the body than
retaining it in the "slumber room."
5
9 Janus was a two-faced Roman god whose insignia were the key which opens and
closes doors, and the stick with which porters drove away those who had no right to
cross the threshold. His earlier name was Chaos. See I.anoussE ENCYCLOPEDIA oF MYTHOLOCY 214 (1959).
GoArnold v. Spears, 217 Miss. 209, 63 So. 2d 850 (1953). The court distinguished
this situation from that in Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1950) by
stating that the wrongful act in KirkseJ implied malice while the act here did not. This
defendant did nothing calculated to cause the mother to suffer mental anguish, nor did
his acts amount to a wilful, wanton, and reckless disregard of her rights. When the mother
paid the additional charges, she did so voluntarily. Cf. Crawford v. Larson, 216 Minn.
417, 13 N.W.2d 137 (1944), where a son was held liable for the balance due on his
mother's casket, despite his counterclaim alleging damages because of the funeral director's refusal to go on with the interment until the bill was paid. What makes Crawford
a proper decision is that the funeral directors did not detain the body and that there
had been a planned delay of several months between the time the casket was placed in
a vault and its scheduled interment, so that the son had fair opportunity to settle the
account.
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for not permitting a widow to view her husband's remains. 61 Declaring
that the undertaker apparently obtained the body from the decedents
employers or the public authorities after an accidental explosion and
fire, that he had no reason to believe the funeral would be conducted
from his mortuary, and that there was no contract, express or implied,
calling on him to expose the body to view, the court permitted him,
without penalty for the widow's mental distress, to falsely tell her the
body was charred beyond recognition. The undertaker may have acted
from a sense of solicitude for the widow's feelings. "But," insisted the
court, "whatever the reason advanced, whether simply a matter of
mistaken opinion, or false, since plaintiff was claiming a right she did
not enjoy, the defendant may not be made to respond in damages by
reason thereof." 2 The widow was entitled to a return of the body in
its condition at death, yet the court apparently felt that embalming
either made no change in the final condition or was not equivalent to
mutilation, and that the right to have the body in a particular condition
did not include the lesser right to inspect it to see if the body's temporary custodian had violated that right. And so, when the widow had
the body exhumed, Truth crushed to earth did rise again as the poet
had predicted, but Error, far from writhing in pain and dying among
his worshippers, received judgment and costs.
In concluding this section on an undertaker's liability for his intentional acts, it is useful to compare similar acts independently performed
by an undertaker and a member of another profession, to determine
whether liability arises because of the act itself or the status of the
person who committed it. We would agree that certain causes of
action, like battery, rarely depend for their success on the manner in
which the defendant earns his living. By contrast, the things one man
can publicly say about another with impunity depend very much on
whether an attorney-client relationship exists between them. We run
into difficulties in those intermediate areas where a relationship does
appear but its extent is vague. Can we, for example, decide the validity
of a lawsuit based on the unauthorized publication of a dead person's
photograph, unless we know who the parties are?
When the parents of a fifteen year old girl killed in an automobile
accident sue a newspaper for mental anguish stemming from publica61 Infield v. Cope, 58 N.M. 308, 270 P.2d 716 (1954).
62 Id. at 313, 270 P.2d at 719. This was a 3-2 decision, lacking written dissents. See

also The San Francisco Examiner, Jan. 18, 1964, p. 1, cols. 4-6, for a news story on
the burial of a United States Army sergeant who had been killed by a Panamanian sniper
and was being interred in Arlington National Cemetery. His widow "barely got to the
cemetery in time for a last look at his body and for that look had to pay a funeral home
cosmetician $25 on the spot."
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tion of a photograph that depicted her features in a deformed and
hideous manner, should they recover damages? Not according to the
Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, which recognized that one
who intentionally mistreats a dead body is liable in tort to the family
member entitled to dispose of the body, but added that the newspaper
photographer's act no more interfered with the parents' possession than
did the gaze of a curious bystander who witnessed the death, and that
no right of privacy was invaded. 3 The decision appears to be wise,
however distressed we might be that someone dear to us will be pictured in death agonies for an amused readership. We understand,
though often grimly, that the social interest in giving newspapers freedom to accurately portray events-perhaps in behalf of a highway safety
campaign-makes us vulnerable when the public becomes curious about
our own lives. Our right to privacy covers far less ground than our
desire for emotional peace.
Should we reach the same decision if a widow, asking for no undue
publicity or notoriety, hires an undertaker to fly her husband's body
from one city to another during stormy weather and the undertaker,
successfully completing his mission, then has a newspaper advertisement published with a photograph of the body moved from the airplane
to the hearse, a caption identifying the decedent and his widow, and
laudatory comments on the undertakers accomplishment? Like the
Colorado Supreme Comrt, 64 I consider this conduct actionable in a
suit for the widow's humiliation, mental suffering, and agony. As the
court noted, written contracts are rarely made with funeral directors.
Because there is neither the time nor the mental tranquility essential
to ordinary negotiations, the agreements are usually oral and much is
necessarily left to implication. While bereavement encourages sketchy
bargains, the survivors still suffer agony akin to torture when they encounter callousness, indifference, insult or indignity.
So true is this that the chief asset of a mortician and the most conspicuous element of his advertisement is his consideration for the
afflicted. A decent respect for their feelings is implied in every contract for his services. If this be not true, there is nothing to prevent
the embalming of a body and the parading of it through city streets,
exposed to the gaze of curious throngs, while a hired crier calls attention to it as an example of the undertakers skill. Certainly no stipula6s Kelley v. Post Pub. Co., 327 Mass. 275, 98 N.E.2d 286 (1951). The court recognized that other jurisdictions hold similar complaints valid as stating an invasion of the
right to privacy. See also Pnossmi, TORTS 641-44 (2d ed. 1955).
8
4Fitzsimmons v. Olinger Mortuary Ass'n, 91 Colo. 544, 17 P.2d 535 (1932). Two
judges dissented on procedural grounds not relevant here.
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tion need be made in the contract of employment to protect relatives
65
of the deceased from such an outrage.
We might try to distinguish our examples by urging that a news
photograph differs in kind from a paid advertisement, proclaiming that
an advertiser's notices are somehow more galling than journalistic
efforts to achieve a large enough circulation to attract those very advertisers. But most certainly we will return to a comparison of the

duties owed to a decedents surviving relatives by a newspaperman and
a hired undertaker. The newspaperman's duties, like those of an undertaker who is a stranger to the survivor, are duties of the public at large;
much greater obligations fall on the undertaker who has agreed to
manage the funeral arrangements. On the hired funeral director falls
the ordinarily remunerative job of contributing to the survivors' peace
of mind, a duty best stated in the negative: he must not aggravate the

survivors' grief by wilful

6

acts which he was in a position to commit

because of his liberty to approach the corpse, or which were calculated

to annoy, oppress, or humiliate the survivors. He has these duties
because he actively sought them out. Since mental anguish is the only
substantial damage to arise from violations of that responsibility, the
funeral director should be prepared to make financial amends for any
added distress he causes.
Liability for Negligent Acts
We might agree that a funeral director should be forced to pay
for his wilful acts, and yet feel he should escape liability on a showing
65 Id. at 547-48, 17 P.2d at 536-37. The court further said that the stipulation
against undue publicity or notoriety left no doubt of the undertakers bounden contractual duty to do nothing to outrage the feelings of an ordinary person or unnecessarily
inflict humiliation, mental suffering, and agony. Citing Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App.
225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913), the court held that damages were available for mental suffering because the undertaker's breach of contract involved wilful, wanton, or insulting
conduct. Among the widow's allegations was her complaint that the community believed
she was paid to let the picture be taken and circulated. Cf. Leavey v. Cooney, 214
Cal. App. 2d 497, 29 Cal. Rptr. 580 (1963), which allowed damages for a deputy district attorney's humiliation and embarrassment caused by the defendants' breach of contract in distributing a motion picture to motion picture theatres, rather than limiting it
to television showings. The district attorney, who had.prosecuted Caryl Chessman, agreed
to appear in a filmed dramatization of Chessman's trial and imprisonment, but refused
to do so unless distribution was specifically restricted. Explaining to the movie producer
that he had never made a dime out of any case in which he took part, the prosecutor
insisted he was not now going to make it appear that he had. The producer agreed to
these terms but later reneged and had the film widely distributed. That deliberate act
justified the damages awarded, since the public would think the prosecutor was being
compensated for his participation in the film and he would be subjected to severe
criticism.
66 Whether negligent acts should also lead to recovery is discussed in the text at
notes 67-104.
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that the survivor's grief was caused by nothing more serious than negligence. Taking such a position, we would assert that an undertaker

suffers no liability for emotional harm when he so carelessly and negligently embalms a corpse that his bungling causes mortification to the
surviving husband, 6 7 though we would, presumably, charge him fully

for the ordinarily probable effects of his negligently driving a hearse.
We might commend the reasoning of the Wisconsin Supreme Court,

which said:
It is obvious that in mere negligence there is no intent to offer indignity to, or wound the feelings of, another; and it may be legitimately
said, as a matter of law, that such result from mere inadvertance is
so remote and beyond ordinary probabilities that there exists no proximate causal relation between the two, unless a physical injury is
caused,
out of which, in natural sequence, arises mental, like physical,
6
pain. 8

But on analyzing this statement we should wonder how much it

says. That in "mere negligence" there is no "intent" to do harm is
fundamental tort law, and is therefore "obvious." Liability, however,
finds a peg in the offending party's failure to meet a standard required

by circumstances, by his own capabilities, and by his relationship to
the injured person. Once we measure the extent of the duty and discover a breach, we hold a party liable for the harm he caused. In spite
67 See, e.g., Dunahoo v. Bess, 146 Fla. 182, 200 So. 541 (1941), which held that
the undertaker did face limited liability for breach of contract. See also Spomer v. City
of Grand Junction, 144 Colo. 207, 355 P.2d 960 (1960), which reversed a dismissal in
favor of a municipal cemetery because the city's acts in disinterring the body of a child
might reasonably be considered wilful and wanton; Arnold v. Spears, 217 Miss. 209,
63 So. 2d 850 (1953); Sanford v. Ware, 191 Va. 43, 60 S.E.2d 10 (1950), which recognized that courts are in hopeless conflict on the issue of mental pain as a proper element
in damages; Kirksey v. Jernigan, 45 So. 2d 188 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1950), which reaffirmed
the rule against recovery for mental pain unconnected with physical injury in an action
arising from negligent breach of contract, but refused to extend the rule to purely tort
actions implying malice or great indifference; Boyle v. Chandler, 33 Del. 323, 138 Ad.
273 (1927), which supported the rule as to negligence, but allowed recovery for wilful,
wanton, fraudulent, reckless, or grossly negligent acts; Gadbury v. Bleitz, 133 Wash.
134, 233 Pac. 299 (1925), which allowed recovery on the basis of a wilful wrong, but
recognized that precedents would not support an action for simple negligence; Nail v.
McCullough, 88 Okla. 243, 212 Pac. 981 (1923); Kneass v. Cremation Society, 103 Wash.
521, 175 Pac. 172 (1918); Beaulieu v. Great Northern Ry. Co., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W.
353 (1907); Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905); Gatzow v. Buening,
106 Wis. 1, 81 N.W. 1003 (1900); Grill v. Abele Funeral Home, Inc., 69 Ohio App. 51,
42 N.E.2d 788 (1940); Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913); Norton
v. Kull, 74 Misc. 476, 132 N.Y.S. 387 (1911); Mauger v. Gordon, 22 Ohio Ops. 436,
7 Ohio Supp. 98 (1941), which said that if the rule against recovery is obsolete, it
should be abandoned by a reviewing court, rather than one at the nisi prius level.
68Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 465, 102 N.W. 40, 44 (1905), which reversed
the sustaining of a demurrer because the decedent's son alleged more than negligence
in charging the defendant with refusing to return his mother's stomach for burial.
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of the court's implications, negligence is a term of blame rather than
praise.
To say that a result was "remote and beyond ordinary probabilities"
is to say that it was unexpected. Surprise at reality, however, differs
from actual causal relation. As Helen Palsgraf, that unwilling progenitor of so much legal discord, discovered, an event may be a substantial factor in producing harm through a natural and continuous
sequence from act to injury, and yet be sheltered from legal consequences because the act performed had no foreseeable relationship to
the harm that occurred.69 The "scope of the risk" advocates do agree
that the questioned conduct triggered the harm. If, for example, Mrs.
Palsgraf had been insured against the risk of personal injury from
objects thrown down by explosions, the insurer would be bound to
compensate her.70 But, except for such unique relationships, the "scope
of the risk" school insists that legal cause is different from physical
cause (and for 'legal cause" we may substitute "proximate cause" or
"legal liability" or "liability of commerce and industry" or "judicial
fear that commercial and industrial timidity because of potential exposure to harm claimed by unknown parties from unknown causes
would cause social progress to end"71). This being so, a statement that

remoteness precluded proximate causation, applied to funeral directors, means that as a matter of law a reasonable undertaker could not
have foreseen during the time he was inattentive to duty that his negli72
gence would excite mental anguish in the decedents kin.
We might add to this viewpoint denying liability the words of the
Minnesota Supreme Court: "A breach of contract involves only such
consequences as directly result therefrom and were within the contemplation of the parties when the contract was made, and which may
be measured and determined by some definite rule or standard of
compensation."73

Consequences "measured and determined by some definite rule
or standard of compensation"-what does that mean? In seeking
equitable remedies, a party is likely to claim that his potential dam69 Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 162 N.E. 99 (1928).
70 But see PROSSER & SMITh, CASES & MATERIALS ON TORTS 364, n.1 (3d ed. 1962),
noting that a study of the Palsgraf record "indicates that as described in the opinions,
the event could not possibly have happened."
71 See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr.
33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963); Ryan v. N.Y. Cent. R.R., 35 N.Y. 210 (1866).
72 Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905), quoted in the text at note
68, does say that proximate cause exists when physical injury results. How does subse-

quent physical harm relate back to foreseeability creating duty at the time of the disputed
act? See also the text at notes 45 and 96;-99.
73 Beaulieu v. Great Northern Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 52-53, 114 N.W. 353, 355 (1907).
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ages are of such a nature money recompense would do him little
good. Adamantly, he denies the possibility that his injuries fall within
some definite standard of compensation. He urges this position, not
from a moral impulse to confess the illegitimacy of his cause, but to
qualify for extraordinary relief. When he succeeds in convincing the
court that his loss would be unique, he benefits from equity's imaginative patronage. Are we thus to say that a party who has not yet been
harmed is more favored than one who appears tearful, grief stricken,
and emotionally distraught because of already-executed carelessness?
Or are we saying that we would have eagerly prevented the mental
anguish if asked to do so in time but, having been denied that chance,
75
74
now consider money damages inappropriate or unmeasurable?
As to the suggested inappropriateness of dollars and cents damages,
we must accept the fact that Anglo-American jurisprudence, wrought
from centuries of common law expedients and statutory maneuvers,
has evolved no better answer for its daily round of lamentations than
favoring an aggrieved party with a money judgment and an implied
wish that he can collect it. In our system of substituted reparation we
cannot do otherwise-unless we refuse to do anything at all. Why a
wrongdoer should benefit from this judicial crisis is perplexing. Once
a plaintiff makes his prayer for the best relief available, appropriateness should no longer be an issue. Had he looked upon the remedy
as undesirable, he would never have filed the complaint.
As to the claimed unmeasurability of damages for mental anguish,
we should promptly acknowledge that courts have found a passable
measure in cases based on assault, a right to privacy, alienation of
affections, seduction, abduction, malicious conduct, wilfiness, wantonness, and intentional infliction of emotional harm, even when liability for emotional harm arising outside these categories is rejected.76
Our judicial records also make clear the possibility of calculating damages for a schoolteacher whose face was scarred;7 7 for an injured mongoloid child, twenty three months old, based in part on the extent to
which the injury will hinder him in leading whatever normal life he
would otherwise have been competent to lead; 78 for a singer who had
never performed as a 'lull" act but would have done so if her finger
See text at note 28.
75 Let us in passing note the difference, despite dictionary interchangeability, between "unmeasurable" and "immeasurable." Who would consistently deny recovery for
immeasurable harm?
76 See Mauger v. Gordon, 22 Ohio Ops. 436, 7 Ohio Supp. 98 (1941). See also
Koerber v. Patek, 123 Wis. 453, 102 N.W. 40 (1905); Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307,
50 N.W. 238 (1891); PnossEa, TonTs 40-46 (2d ed. 1955).
77 Bethke v. Duwe, 256 Wis. 378, 41 N.W.2d 277 (1950).
78
Miami Paper Co. v. Johnston, 58 So. 2d 869 (Fla Sup. Ct. 1952).
74
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had not been injured; 79 and for a thirteen month old child whose hands
were cut off by a locomotive, provided the jury considered whether a

person who loses his hands in infancy is likely to feel the same sense
of humiliation as one who sustains this loss in later life.80 The jury
tallies the value of harm without measuring the pecuniary worth of
pain and suffering by the hour, the day, or the week, 81 nor by setting
a price at which someone else would willingly endure the same pain

the victim had suffered. 2 What the jurors must use is their common
sense, regulated by the evidence and superintended by the trial judge
and, as necessary, an appellate court. For those who condemn this
procedure because of its shortcomings, I submit that the jury's mathe-

matical inadequacies deserve less abuse than the wrongdoer's failure
to have avoided the original harm. The chance of an excessive or in-

adequate award is similar in kind to, and not significantly different
in degree from, the chance that occurs in every case where the wrongdoer has caused damage which lacks a fixed catalogue value.88
We have remaining, then, the questions of whether the prevention
of mental anguish was in the parties' original contemplation when
79 Benshetler v. Palumbo Motors, 380 Pa. 353, 110 A.2d 207 (1954). A 'ull"
is the trade term for a singer who accompanies herself.
8
o Virginian Ry. Co. v. Armentrout, 166 F.2d 400 (4th Cir. 1948).
81 See Botta v. Brunner, 26 N.J. 82, 138 A.2d 713 (1958).
82 See Loftin v. Wilson, 67 So. 2d 185 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1953).

act

83 Underlying much hostility towards mental suffering litigation is a judicial (but
not necessarily judicious) fear of attorneys, plaintiffs, and jurors. As has been said:
In the last half century the ingenuity of counsel, stimulated by the cupidity
of clients and encouraged by the prejudices of juries, has expanded the action
for negligence until it overtops all others in frequency and importance; but it is
only in the very end of that period that it has been stretched to the effort to
cover so intangible, so untrustworthy, so illusory, and so speculative a cause of
action as mere mental disturbance. It requires but a brief judicial experience to
be convinced of the large proportion of exaggeration, and even of actual fraud,
in the ordinary action for physical injuries from negligence; and if we opened
the door to this new invention the result would be great danger, if not disaster,
to the cause of practical justice.
Huston v. Freemansburg, 212 Pa. 548, 550-51, 61 AtI. 1022, 1023 (1905). Yet this attitude exemplifies a belief that our judicial system has failed. Perhaps it has. Perhaps
Machiavellian attorneys, deceitful clients, and gullible jurors systematically unite to rob
innocent defendants of their hard-earned gains and terrorize upright judges with precedents from benighted jurisdictions. If this were true, surely our efforts would require
a change in the administration of justice, the fact-finding and law-applying machinery,
and not just a haphazard singling out of individual causes of action as inducements to
rascality. In noting with disapproval that the action for negligence overtops all others
in frequency and importance, the court avoids describing the litigation it considers most
important or deserving of periodic repetition. Would it prefer breach of contract actions?
Divorce? Homicide? Or, with its reference to opening the door, does the court mean
that the best litigation is the least litigation? By what ordered system would we then
give every man his due?
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made,8 4 and whether the

their agreement was
negligence was of the
sort reasonably calculated to have produced the result it did for the
injured party.8 5 If so, the funeral director should be held liable for
the mental suffering which his negligence has caused. If not, he should
be protected by the general rule barring recovery for those damages
stemming from a negligent breach of contract.
Rather than open our discussion with death, we should hearken
to another common event which most participants view somewhat less
apprehensively: marriage. Planning to marry a man of wealth and
high social standing, of the same rank to which she herself belonged,
a young woman had her mother telegraph New Orleans' most fashionable clothiers to furnish five dresses as her bridal gown and trousseau.
All the gowns were due before her wedding day. Unfortunately, the
wedding dress, which arrived first and "should have been a thing of
beauty, delightful to a young bride to wear," proved to be too short.
Overcome by disappointment and chagrin, the bride-elect took to her
bed. Telegrams of complaint to the clothiers led to their refusal to
send the other four dresses. The young woman, who was absolutely
counting on having them, found herself ill-equipped for the entertainments incidental to her wedding and so, after having declined all invitations in the several cities she visited, discontinued the bridal tour.
She then brought suit against the clothiers for her mortification and
humiliation because of their failure to send the four sought-after
dresses. Judgment in her favor was affirmed on appeal.8 6
84 "Where two parties have made a contract which one of them has broken, the
damages which the other party ought to receive in respect of such breach of contract
should be such as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising naturally, i.e.,
according to the usual course of things, from such breach of contract itself, or such as
may reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of both parties, at the
time they made the contract, as the probable result of the breach of it." Hadley v.
Baxendale, 9 Ex. 341, 354, 156 Eng. Rep. 145, 151 (1854).
85 "The risk reasonably to be perceived defines the duty to be obeyed and risk
imports relation; it is a risk to another or to others within the range of apprehension."
Palsgraf v. Long Island R.R., 248 N.Y. 339, 344, 162 N.E. 99, 100 (1928). See also
Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 379 P.2d
513 (1963).
86
Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903); followed in Mitchell v.
Shreveport Laundries, 61 So. 2d 539 (La. Ct. App. 1952), which allowed a prospective
bridegroom to recover damages for his embarrassment, humiliation, and mental distress
caused by a laundry's failure, after full disclosure of his need for prompt service, to
return his "good" suit in time for his wedding. As a result, he had to attend the wedding
ceremony in his "other" suit, which was soiled and unkempt. The laundry unsuccessfully urged that plaintiffs embarrassment was caused by his frugality in owning only
one good suit of clothes and in failing to disclose this fact to its agent. But cf. Eller v.
Carolina & W. Ry., 140 N.C. 140, 52 S.E. 305 (1905), an action against a railroad for
negligently damaging a prospective bride's trousseau, dismissed because the bride tried
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Making it clear that the general rule limited damages to the pecuniary loss sustained or gain prevented, the court recognized that some
contracts were meant to gratify an intellectual enjoyment in religion,
morality, or taste, or some convenience or other legal satisfaction.
Although these agreements are not valued in money by the parties,
damages are still due after a breach. The clothiers must have known
that if the dresses remained unfinished by the wedding day the bride
would be keenly disappointed. In gauging her disappointment, the
jury properly took into account the fact that planned entertainments
were given up and that she was humiliated in going to her husband
without a suitable trousseau.
This controversy, though charming, should be treated more like
stern precedent than a trivial anecdote.T With sound reasoning and
application it yields a compelling point: In certain recognized circumstances, those who bargain for goods and services do so because they
have confronted an outstanding event which needs a capable practitioner, familiar with such proceedings, to guide it to its fullest realization of sorrow, dignity, or joy. Far more than in ordinary circumstances
(or at least more generally acknowledged to be so), the goods or services are a means, secondary in themselves, of achieving emotional
gratification from the event. When the supposedly qualified practitioner negligently fails to carry out the bargain, he destroys something
greater than he alone could have provided or charged for. He destroys
emotional peace.
Most avoidable emergencies, of course, upset us. Is our sorrow
customarily to receive monetary balm from those persons with whom
we had business relationships in the past and whose carelessness contributed to our current plight?88 Certainly not. The fiery destruction
of a barn due to a faulty hot water heater may bring grief and psychic
trauma, yet by no stretch of the imagination is a contract to install the
appliance intended to gratify some intellectual enjoyment which, when
frustrated, gives rise to mental anguish that could have been foreseen.8O
to split her cause of action by settling for property damages and then suing for mental
anguish.
8
7For
example, Lewis v. Holmes, 109 La. 1030, 34 So. 66 (1903) was cited in
Westervelt v. McCullough, 68 Cal. App. 198, 228 Pac. 734 (1924) (a wrongful mortgage
foreclosure case), which in turn was relied on in Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196
P.2d 915 (1948) (an undertakers breach of contract case), which in turn controlled
Carew v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959)
(another undertakers breach of contract case).
88 The words "business relationships" are significant, meant to distinguish this class
of cases from those where the parties have had no dealings other than through an alleged
tort. See text at notes 99-102.
89 Sahuc v. U.S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 320 F.2d 18 (5th Cir. 1963). See also
Preece v. Baur, 143 F. Supp. 804 (D.C. Idaho 1956), which struck allegations seeking
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Nor does a railroad become liable for refusing to guarantee that a son
anxious to see his dying father will make proper train connections at
a distant town, since the railroad had not contemplated a distinction
between the son's natural anxiety for his father and his nervous impatience at being detained at the expected place of departure.9° For
liability arising from negligent handling of a telegram which was meant
to announce death or near-death, courts are divided, a minority insisting that damages should be available for a breach that does not seriously affect a man's pocketbook but "does relate to his feelings, his
emotions, his sensibilities-those finer qualities which go to make the
man."01 Most courts dealing with negligently managed messages, however, assert that "The law looks only to the pecuniary value9 2 of a contract, and for its breach awards only pecuniary damages."
damages for a father's mental anguish caused when defendant's electric range and hot
water heater set the father's home afire while his children were sleeping upstairs. And
see Sullivan v. H. P. Hood & Sons, 341 Mass. 216, 168 N.E.2d 80 (1960), which denied
recovery for mental anguish, unaccompanied by injury from without, to a woman who
had drunk milk spiced with the fecal matter of a dead mouse, which was also in the
milk carton.
DO
Wilcox v. Richmond & D. R. Co., 52 Fed. 264 (4th Cir. 1892). Though stating it
was a moot question on this record as to whether breach of contract actions could lead to
recovery for emotional distress, the court said that damages cannot be recovered for
disappointment and mental suffering alone. It registered disapproval of the son's claimed
damages because he did not allege any pecuniary injury "such as the loss of an expected
legacy." Id. at 266. But cf. Birmingham Transfer & Traffic Co. v. Still, 7 Ala. App. 556,
61 So. 611 (1913), which allowed a father to recover damages for mental suffering
because the defendant transfer company carried his child's small coffin like ordinary
baggage, piled in a dray with seven or eight trunks and with two men sitting on the
cargo. The court held that the transportation agreement contained a necessary implication, violated here, that the company would move the body in a suitable and befitting
manner. For other cases involving mental anguish because of the negligent transportation of a corpse, see Beaulieu v. Great N. Ry., 103 Minn. 47, 114 N.W. 353 (1907),
which rejected a right to recovery; and, supporting that right, Louisville & N. R.R. v.
Hull, 113 Ky. 561, 68 S.W. 433 (1902), which approved the cause of action but reversed
a judgment for plaintiff because of his attorney's inflammatory closing argument (e.g.,
"That shows how railroads do. They are exceedingly accommodating when there is any
money in sight. They will hold a train an hour for a negro minstrel show, but it could
not hold its train three minutes to get a corpse on the train. There was no money in
that." Id. at 573, 68 S.W. at 435); Hale v. Bonner, 82 Tex. 33, 17 S.W. 605 (1891);
Missouri, K. & T. Ry. v. Linton, 109 S.W. 942 (Tex. Civ. App. 1908), which reversed
a judgment for plaintiff because of improper testimony from a witness who could not
know or distinguish between a mother's natural grief for the loss of her son, which was
not a proper element of damages, and any disappointment the mother might have felt
from a delay in shipping her son's remains.
91 Mentzer v. Western Union Tel. Co., 93 Iowa 752, 762, 62 N.W. 1, 4 (1895).
02 Francis v. Western Union Tel. Co., 58 Minn. 252, 59 N.W. 1078 (1894). Referring to the "Texas doctrine," which allowed damages for mental anguish, the court
observed: "The 'Texas doctrine' has been favorably referred to in many of the more
recent text-books, but the bench and bar will understand of how little weight as authority
most of these books are, written as they very frequently are, by hired professional book-

THE HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

So imbedded as precedent are the telegram cases that we must
make a factual determination before proceeding further. If telegrams
are exactly like funerals,93 the negligent handling of a corpse will lead
in most jurisdictions to no recovery for pure mental anguish. Are
there, then, any significant differences between them? Telegraph companies serve people who for one reason or another wish to transmit
information without using the telephone or writing letters. The messenger service must accommodate dispatches containing business data,
greetings, social information, condolences, and as wide a variety of
sentiments as can be expressed by words on paper. The situations
in which the companies are vulnerable (or arguably should be vulnerable) to lawsuits based on emotional distress are those where a
sender has informed a telegraph agent of the message's urgency, or
the contents clearly spell out an emotionally-charged event. But even
there the substantive contents of the messages do not require unique
mechanical handling; the same wires which carry messages about
grain futures carry pleas for an errant son to come home because his
father is dangerously ill. Assuming that the telegraph company makes
no special promises about handling a particular telegram, the treatment
of the messages is neutral with respect to time, place, and manner of
delivery. The companies are not asked to determine whether recipient
A should be made to wait until recipient B's message is delivered, nor
whether an ambiguous phrase has mortal significance. Because of the
nature and scope of the companies' operations and the comparatively
few times mental suffering is likely to occur to a substantial degree
(as opposed to ordinary annoyance whenever plans go awry), we are
willing to make a socially valuable choice. We prefer to have a relatively cheap means of transmitting speedy messages to a cautious
system in which the companies take all possible precautions, with
attendant delays, to protect themselves from premium verdicts. We
penalize fault for its most common result, pecuniary damage, and leave
unremedied those claims, however worthy, that would intimidate our
communications network into overly-guarded service.
For the funeral industry these considerations are beside the mark.
Only one subject, death, brings customers to utilize undertaking estabmakers of no special legal ability, and who are usually inclined to take up with the latest
legal novelty for the same reasons that newspapers are anxious for the latest news." Id.
at 263, 59 N.W. at 1080.
93 "An elephant can be identified as a sunflower-both have long stems. A camel
is indistinguishable from a peanut-if only their humps be considered .... [But] no
logician would be satisfied with identifying a peanut as a camel, because both have
humps: he demands accessory agreement-that both can live a long time without water,
for instance." FORT, Tim Boox oF TI D
-nmD
62-63 (1919; Ace Star ed., ca. 1962).
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. was "one of the greatest Forteans." Id. at 10.

May, 1964]

FUNERAL DIRECTORS

lishments. The funeral directors' dual focus is on the physical disposal
of human remains and a measure of comfort for the survivors. 94 While
an individual agreement with a funeral director may emphasize disposal rather than sympathy, the usual arrangements stress concern for
the mourners. As the president of a national morticians' group has
written in defense of current mortuary practices:
The families are striving to express their grief, their personal sense
of the appropriate, as best they can in the harrowing, tragic days of
a most complex religious, social and emotional crisis. They need all
the help, encouragement and sincere interest that anyone can give
them-not criticism for failure to conform to something of which they
have no knowledge or experience. 95
When the families, purse in hand, turn to the funeral industry for
part of this help, encouragement, and sincere interest, is there any
doubt about what the undertakers are expected to achieve? If the
survivors' emotional tension becomes aggravated by an undertakers
negligence, should courts as a matter of law rather than individual
contract deny recovery for the superimposed grief? In my opinion,
no. Yet courts have done so, reasoning that mental anguish cannot be
treated as an independent ground of damages to support an action
for that injury alone,90 or that a passive breach of contract, though
amounting to negligence, does not create liability in the absence of
9
wantonness, wilfulness, or insult. 7
Taking these positions requires the courts to consider mental anguish as a result somehow unrelated to the original funeral agreement,
when in fact this anguish is the direct counterpart of the commodity,
emotional equilibrium, which formed the subject of the contract. What
courts have said in denying recovery would apply to an undertaker's
suit for mental anguish because a survivor negligently failed to pay
his bill. The undertaker bargained for a particular price to be paid
at a particular time. His damages relate directly to his expectations,
which were pecuniary ones. The ordinary survivor's expectations were
different. For him, the essence of the contract was a reasonable expectation of dignity, tranquility, and personal consolation (although a
jury in any individual case might find he had struck a different bargain). To say that these expectations, when carelessly disappointed,
04Subsidiary activities do exist. At a price per copy of approximately sixty cents,
for example, Forest Lawn Memorial Park of Los Angeles sells a coloring book about itself.
95 See the letter from W. L. Busterud, President, National Selected Morticians, N.Y.
Times,
Sept. 28, 1963, p. 18, cols. 4-5.
9
6 Nail v. McCullough & Lee, 88 Okla. 243, 212 Pac. 981 (1923).
97 Hall v. Jackson, 24 Colo. App. 225, 134 Pac. 151 (1913). Accord, Kneass v. Cremation Society, 103 Wash. 521, 175 Pac. 172 (1918).
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were foreign to the agreement is to declare that the survivor bought
no more than a box and a hole in the ground. To say that the expecta-

tions have no monetary value is to deny that the contract ever could
have been written in the first place-else how could the funeral director
price his services? Surely a more accurate view of these agreements
comes from the North Carolina Supreme Court:
The tenderest feelings of the human heart center around the remains
of the dead. When the defendants contracted with plaintiff to inter
the body of her deceased husband in a workmanlike manner they
did so with the knowledge that she was the widow and would naturally and probably suffer mental anguish if they failed to fulfil their
contractual obligation in the manner here charged. The contract was
predominantly personal in nature and no substantial pecuniary loss
would follow its breach. Her mental concern, her sensibilities, and her
solicitude were the prime considerations for the contract, and the
contract itself was such as to put the defendants on notice that a
failure on their part to inter the body properly would probably produce mental suffering on her part. It cannot be said, therefore, that
contemplation of the parties at
such damages were not within the
98
the time the contract was made.
Not only was the potential harm within the parties' contemplation
but, more fundamentally, the parties themselves were in each other's

contemplation, even when the closest survivor had a representative
make the detailed arrangements for him.99 The survivor's rights to
recovery are therefore undisturbed by the line of cases rejecting liability for a bystander's emotional anguish at seeing injury befall a third
person outside the bystander's range of peril. 100 A survivor is not a
98

Lamm v. Shingleton, 231 N.C. 10, 15, 55 S.E.2d 810, 813 (1949), which also
said that when the defendants, who held themselves out as specially qualified to perform
the duties of an undertaker, agreed to conduct the funeral, they impliedly covenanted to
perform the contemplated services in a good and workmanlike manner. A dissenting judge
argued that the widow had contracted to have the body buried in a specific way, i.e.,
in a watertight vault, and should be entitled to show this breach, rather than be limited
to a showing that the burial was not done in a workmanlike manner. Other cases allowing
recovery for mental anguish because of the nature of the funeral agreement include:
Chelini v. Nieri, 32 Cal. 2d 480, 196 P.2d 915 (1948); Brown Funeral Homes & Insurance Co. v. Baughn, 226 Ala. 661, 148 So. 154 (1933); Renihan v. Wright, 125 Ind.
536, 25 N.E. 822 (1890); Baumann v. White, 234 N.Y.S.2d 272 (Sup. Ct. 1962);
Carew v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d 181 (1959);
Taylor v. Bearden, 6 Tenn. C.C.A. 33, 34 (1915), which noted, "this is a singular
lawsuit, but its novelty is not sufficient to repel the one who brought it."; Loy v. Reid,
11 Ala. App. 231, 65 So. 855 (1914). See also Wright v. Beardsley, 46 Wash. 16, 89
Pac. 172 (1907), which states that an action based on wrongful and improper burial
may be considered a tort.
99 See note 50.
100 See, e.g., Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr.
33, 379 P.2d 513 (1963), where the court by a 4-3 vote ruled that a pregnant mother
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bystander. He has quasi-property rights in the corpse different from

any rights a bystander may claim in the injured person. 10 1 If the roots
of liability for negligence require that the wrongdoer must have owed
an original duty of care to the person injured, or to the class of which
the injured person is a member, 10 2 these duties to the survivor were
established by the funeral agreement. Negligence, though usually a
tort term, is equally applicable to show breach of a contract in which

reasonable standards are implied.103
Even when these propositions are accepted as a groundwork for
liability, the survivor claiming damages must nevertheless overcome

formidable challenges before he can justify his position. He must show
either that the funeral director was negligent, having fallen away from
reasonable standards in the carrying out of his assignment, or that the
funeral director failed to produce the results he had promised in the
original agreement. 04 More than that, the survivor must show a proper
failed to state a good cause of action in seeking damages for her mental distress at
seeing a truck run over her seventeen month old son. The minority position, however,
which would have favored the mother, actually represented the views of a majority of
the court's permanent members, one of whom could not hear this appeal because he
had written the district court of appeal decision in the same case. See also Lahann v.
Cravotta, 228 N.Y.S.2d 371 (Sup. Ct. 1963), which similarly rejects a bystander's right
to recover.
'10 As the dissenting opinion in Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., acidly
notes: "Recovery for emotional disturbance resulting from abuse of a dead body is
hardly consistent with denial of recovery for emotional distress of a mother who witnesses a child's injury or loss of life. Is the contemplation of injury to the corpse more
disturbing than that of the injury which may cost a child its life?" 59 Cal. 2d 295, 325
n.5, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33, 52 n.5, 379 P.2d 513, 532 n.5, quoting the opinion of Justice Tobriner, then a member of the district court of appeal, 23 Cal. Rptr. 131, 136 n.5 (1962).
This observation, we must remember, was intended to expand liability to include a
bystander's recovery, and not to reduce a survivor's damages.
102 See Amaya v. Home Ice, Fuel & Supply Co., 59 Cal. 2d 295, 29 Cal. Rptr. 33,
379 P.2d 513 (1963), which gave as an example its belief that extension of liability for
negligent driving to spectators who were not themselves in danger would place an unreasonable burden on the highways. Cf. the following cases, which also tumed on the
absence of a duty to the person claiming mental anguish: Tyler v. Brown-Service Funeral
Homes Co., 250 Ala. 295, 34 So. 2d 203 (1948), where a wife sought damages for mental
distress because an ambulance service allegedly was negligent in leaving her sick husband
unattended; Brown Funeral Homes Ins. Co. v. Dobbs, 228 Ala. 482, 153 So. 737 (1934),
a case, somewhat confusing to me, where the court found no contract to exist between
the surviving wife and the allegedly negligent undertaker; Thomasson v. Hackney &
Mole, 159 N.C. 299, 74 S.E. 1022 (1912), where the mother of a deceased child became
upset because a photography store lost the only films she had of the child.
See also Brilhardt v. Ben Tipp, Inc., 48 Wash. 2d 722, 297 P.2d 232 (1956), which
allowed recovery for mental anguish arising from the defendant's continued negligence.
103 See Carew v. Lima, Salmon & Tully Mortuary, 168 Cal. App. 2d 42, 335 P.2d
181 (1959).
104 See Stahl v. William Mecker, Inc., 184 App. Div. 85, 171 N.Y.S. 728 (1918),
which denied liability for a surviving widow's mental suffering because the defendant
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relation between the funeral director's conduct and the survivor's
later complaints, such as the common requirement that the disputed
act was a substantial factor in producing the later harm, without the
supervening effect of an independent cause. The survivor, in short,
must prove his case. For the funeral industry, these principles impose
no greater impositions than that of doing its work reasonably well and
of living up to its promises-although the industry may now be tempted
to promise less.
crematory operator did in fact return the ashes of her husband (as a jury so found),
even though a negligent mislabelling of the urn made the widow feel frightful and
certain the ashes belonged to someone else. The court said:
I can conceive of no tangible basis for any such allowance of damages. A
person may only recover damages for mental suffering which is the natural and
proximate consequence of some wrongful act or neglect on the part of the one
sought to be charged. Independent of some corporeal or personal injury or
breach of duty, there can be no mental suffering for which recovery may be had.
[Citation omitted.] If the jury had found that the plaintiff had been deprived
of her husband's remains by reason of misconduct on defendant's part, then
she would have been entitled to damages for injury to feelings proximately
flowing from defendant's wrongful acts. But here the jury have specifically
found that she has suffered no loss, but, on the contrary, received from the
defendant the ashes of her deceased consort. The verdict of the jury destroyed
any basis for a recovery of damages for mental suffering.
Id. at 92, 171 N.Y.S. at 733.

